

Cracks in the Melting Pot? Religiosity and Assimilation among the Diverse Muslim Population in France¹

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The maintenance of high religiosity levels among Muslim youths in Western Europe constitutes a puzzle in need of an explanation. Focusing on France and using a new empirical strategy for the quantitative study of cultural differences between heterogeneous populations, this study first demonstrates that French Muslims form a diverse group yet one with a consistent and sizable “religiosity differential” resisting intergenerational assimilation to native levels. It then formulates and tests five hypotheses to explain the second generation’s delayed religious assimilation. Material insecurity, the perception and self-report of discrimination, parental religious socialization, transnational ties with the origin country, and neighborhood ethnic segregation are all influential but with an uneven impact across subgroups within native and Muslim populations. Together, results suggest that the religiosity differential stems from a mixture of cultural transmission from the context of origin and blocked acculturation due to stratification and social closure in the context of destination.

INTRODUCTION

Long-standing policy and scholarly discussions surrounding the integration of Muslim immigrants and their children have firmly established religion—rather than race or language—as the primary ground for difference and

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cultural accommodation in Western Europe (Zolberg and Loon 1999; Brubaker 2015). An impressive array of recent studies has documented the legal and institutional aspects of the integration of Islam (Laurence 2012; Carol and Koopmans 2013), the various forms of prejudice Muslims face (Franz 2007; Safi and Simon 2013; Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016; Helbling and Traunmüller 2018), the salience of the Muslim–non-Muslim boundary in shaping friendship and marriage patterns (Carol 2016; Leszczensky and Pink 2017), and European Muslims’ subjective belonging as cultural and racial minorities (Kapko 2007; Bleich 2009; Maxwell and Bleich 2014; Beaman 2015*b*; see Drouhot and Nee [2019] for a review).

At the very heart of this new body of scholarship lies a simple social fact: Muslim immigrants and their children appear to stand out in the secular European context by the intensity of their religious beliefs and practices (Bisin et al. 2007; Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Giesbert 2012; Kashyap and Lewis 2013; Lagrange 2014). Yet despite the rise in scholarly publications on the integration of Muslims in Europe in recent years, such religious vitality—including among the native-born second generation—remains to be explained. This article focuses on precisely characterizing the extent, composition, and sources of such a purported religiosity differential between Muslim populations and natives in France—the European country with the highest relative share of self-identified Muslims.

The contribution in this article is twofold. First, I formulate and implement a novel empirical strategy for the quantitative study of cultural difference—the inductive subgroup comparison approach, a probabilistic strategy relying on fuzzy clustering and Monte Carlo simulation to detect distinct segments of the French native population corresponding to distinct assimilation pathways. This approach allows one to compare Muslim and immigrants from other religious affiliation to socially similar members of the native population and to account for heterogeneity and social structure among both native and immigrant groups—thus avoiding essentializing either as bounded and homogeneous (Alba and Nee 2003; Brubaker 2004, 2013; Vertovec 2007).

Second, I analyze and explain the religiosity differential as a type of cultural difference that is both imported from the context of origin and reproduced in the context of reception. In so doing, I bring together separate strands of the literature in a coherent analytical framework to study the sources of the religiosity differential and parse out their relative weights. Empirically,

Seminar Series, the IMISCOE/Princeton Migration Summer School, and the Culture, Identity and Belonging session at the 2017 meeting of the American Sociological Association for useful feedback and criticisms on earlier drafts of this article. I thank Mauricio Bucca for precious technical and statistical help. Direct correspondence to Lucas G. Drouhot, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Hermann-Föge-Weg 11, 37073 Göttingen, Germany. E-mail: drouhot@mmg.mpg.de

I show that the religiosity differential among second-generation Muslim populations is generally high but heterogeneous across Muslim subgroups. It is principally driven by Muslims' higher propensity to think that their religion is an important part of their personal life and to follow its religiously imposed dietary constraints. By contrast, Muslim populations do not stand out in terms of religious attendance or propensity to wear visible religious signs. Regression models within clusters explain away much of the observed differential, and predicted values show that a parsimonious set of variables are associated with the maintenance of high religiosity among the second generation. Overall, the religiosity differential can be characterized as a mixture of cultural import from the context of origin (as seen through the influence of parental socialization and transnational ties) and blocked acculturation (as seen through the influence of material insecurity, discrimination, and segregation). Importantly, the analyses show that the explanatory power of particular variables varies across subgroups. This illustrates how different, parallel processes are at work in producing cultural difference for different segments of the Muslim population.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. I first define assimilation as a process of cultural embeddedness in the country of destination and as one implying secularization in the European context and the French context in particular. I then discuss recent evidence of delayed religious assimilation among Muslim immigrants and their children. Drawing on the literature on immigration, ethnicity, and race, I outline five possible mechanisms to account for this phenomenon: material deprivation, reactive religiosity, family socialization, transnationalism, and replenished religiosity. I proceed to detail the theoretical motivation and technical implementation of my analytical strategy. Shifting to empirical analysis, I inductively identify subgroups in a representative sample of the French native population, in order to systematically match a sample of first- and second-generation Muslims living in France to a reference category against which I compare and contrast their religiosity. I then model religiosity within each native-immigrant matched subgroup to understand the processes at work behind the second generation's religiosity differential. The final section of the article discusses the significance of the empirical results as well as the payoffs to the new empirical strategy I develop and implement to study cultural difference without essentializing social groups.

ASSIMILATION: DEFINITION, THEORY, AND PRACTICE

Religion and Assimilation: What to Expect for First- and Second-Generation Muslims?

Assimilation can be conveniently defined as a process of increasing social similarity between native and immigrant populations taking place over

one or more generations. Such a process is multidimensional—consisting of structural (labor market attainment and social mobility), relational (friendship networks and union patterns), and symbolic (identity and cultural practices in terms of language and religion) components (Drouhot and Nee 2019). Symbolic dimensions play an important signaling role in that process: assimilation is complete when ethnic origins and cultural differences cease to affect the life chances of immigrants and their children, so that such differences are circumscribed to “symbolic” and “optional” forms such as foods, dress, names, and so on (Gans 1979; Waters 1990; Alba and Nee 2003; Drouhot and Nee 2019).

The largest stride toward assimilation with natives occurs among the second generation grown and socialized in the destination country, with variations across groups and time periods regarding progress or stagnation in the third generation (Gans 1962; Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Jiménez 2010). In the American context, where levels of religious practice and identification have historically been high, one aspect of assimilation is the crystallization of religion as an important aspect of identity and community. As Kasinitz et al. (2008) remark in their study of the second generation in New York City, the U.S.-born children of West Indian, Chinese, Russian, Indian, or South American origins are generally more religious than their parents (pp. 264–72)—something to be expected in a country where atheists have historically been seen as the true “cultural others” (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartman 2006). In the United States in sum, to believe is, by and large, to belong.

In Europe, by contrast, secularization has been part of the broader movement of modernization. As such, increasing social similarity with natives means decreasing levels of religious engagement for immigrant newcomers. Accordingly, contemporary survey research shows that first-generation immigrants’ religiosity lowers over the life course (Van Tubergen 2007; Van Tubergen and Sindradottir 2011). Historical research on earlier migration waves in France shows that the religious practice and identification of Christian immigrants from Poland and Armenia and Jews from Russia were initially high but collapsed in the second generation (Noiriel 1996, chap. 4). In short, evidence in the United States and Europe shows that immigrants settling in religious countries become more religious themselves and vice versa. Depending on the cultural context, immigrant religion can thus be a facilitator or a barrier to inclusion and being considered “one of us” (Foner and Alba 2008). Figure 1 illustrates the contextual nature of the religious context of reception by plotting average self-reported religiosity levels based on large-scale, comparable survey data in Europe and the United States.

Depending on the context of reception, religious assimilation occurs in several possible directions as a form of cultural embeddedness in the destination country. In the European context in general and the French context in



FIG. 1.—Religiosity in Europe and the United States. Source: International Social Survey Program on Religion, 2008, self-described religiosity ranging from 1 “extremely non-religious” to 7 “extremely religious.” Color version available online.

particular, where secularization has been particularly powerful, the expectation is unambiguous: we should observe an intergenerational decay in religiosity as second-generation immigrants become less religious and thus more similar to their native counterparts.

The Empirical Puzzle: Delayed Religious Assimilation in France and Beyond

The available qualitative and quantitative evidence, however, does not corroborate the assimilation-as-secularization scenario outlined above. The qualitative scholarship has depicted French-born Muslims’ subjective religious experience as a mix of underclass-like cultural adaptation to poverty and social exclusion and a rediscovery and reinvention of their parents’ cultural heritage (Lepoutre 1997; Kapko 2007; Kepele 2012a, 2012b).² Kepele (2012b) emphasizes religious change among the young members of the second and third generations who practice an Islam based on public displays of identity—by fasting and following Islamic dietary restrictions—rather than

² Appendix A offers a brief primer on the history of Muslim migration in France and Western Europe.

spirituality and regular attendance of religious service. Such change notwithstanding, existing quantitative studies show that the second generation’s religiosity is surprisingly strong, often as strong as that of their parents (Brouard and Tiberj 2011; Lagrange 2014; Soehl 2017*b*). Brouard and Tiberj (2011) show that the intensity of religious identity and the following of strict behavioral rules stemming from religious texts is much higher among Muslims, regardless of nativity. Lagrange (2014) reaches similar conclusions and talks about a maintenance of religious sentiment in the French-born second generation (pp. 224–30; see also Soehl 2017*b*). This picture differs considerably from the assimilation-as-secularization process documented for earlier waves of Catholic and Jewish immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe (Noiriel 1996, chap. 4).

Figure 2 plots native-immigrant religiosity ratios across major immigrant-religion groups in France using the 2008 Trajectoires et Origines data on which this study relies.

Across Christian immigrant groups, the assimilation expectation holds, as seen by a decrease of the immigrant-native religiosity ratio across generations. While the foreign-born are typically about twice as religious as natives, children




FIG. 2.—Religiosity ratio with natives, by religious group and immigrant generation. Horizontal line at 1.0 is the native level of religiosity, and a 1:1 ratio would indicate similar religiosity levels between immigrants and natives. The religiosity measure is a linear combination of subjective religiosity, religious attendance, respect of religiously imposed dietary constraints, and wearing of a religious sign. Color version available online.

of the foreign-born have markedly lower religiosity. Among Muslim respondents, however, baseline religiosity levels in the first generation are noticeably higher. Moreover, they do not decrease among the second generation, born and socialized in France. Such a phenomenon of delayed religious assimilation constitutes the core empirical puzzle motivating the current study.

Beyond the French case, a new scholarship on assimilation and religiosity has firmly documented a similar phenomenon of religious vitality among Muslims in Europe. Despite modest evidence of assimilation (Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Giesbert 2010; De Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; Maliepaard and Alba 2016), Muslim immigrants and their children's levels of religiosity appear impervious to the secularizing influence of the context of reception, in such diverse national settings as the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Sweden (Bisin et al. 2007; Connor 2010; Güveli and Platt 2011; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Maliepaard et al. 2012; Kashyap and Lewis 2013; Torrekens and Jacobs 2016; see Voas and Fleischmann [2012] and Drouhot and Nee [2019] for reviews).

POSSIBLE MECHANISMS AT WORK: FIVE HYPOTHESES

A broad review of the migration literature leads me to formulate five testable hypotheses to potentially explain the puzzle of delayed religious assimilation among Muslim populations in France.

Material Insecurity

One possibility to explain the religious resilience of Muslims in France is to view religiosity as a response to widespread material insecurity. The “insecurity hypothesis” proposes that certain social conditions such as low income are conducive to high stress and high uncertainty and thus foster the need for structuring narratives provided by the religious experience (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Spiritual life thus compensates for material hardship. The insecurity hypothesis has received empirical support in past studies (Van Tubergen 2007; Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2013). The economic hardship of Muslim communities in France, as seen through spatial relegation in low-income urban areas, is well known and makes the material insecurity hypothesis credible (Lepoutre 1997; Kepel 2012*a*; Drouhot 2020*b*).

HYPOTHESIS 1.—The experience of material insecurity promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.

Reactive Religiosity

A second hypothesis considers the effect of feeling alienated as a result of perceiving or experiencing unfair treatment, leading to an increased identification

with the stereotyped minority group to maintain self-esteem (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999). This hypothesis has been formulated as “reactive ethnicity” within the segmented assimilation framework in sociology (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 2008). It has recently been adapted to religion and reformulated to interpret the observed increase in religious identification associated with perceived or experienced hostility from the majority out-group (Connor 2010; Maliepaard and Alba 2016). Qualitative work on the second generation in France has described the resentment of young Muslims feeling rejected by the rest of the population (Kapko 2007; Marlière 2008; Kepel 2012*a*, 2012*b*). In addition, recent experimental evidence from Adida et al. (2016) has established that there is a distinct and substantial anti-Muslim discrimination on the French labor market. Past work in social psychology differentiates between the effect of perception of diffuse discrimination against one’s group and perception of personal discrimination on in-group attachment (Bourguignon et al. 2006), and therefore both are included in the reactive religiosity hypothesis.

HYPOTHESIS 2.—The perception or experience of discrimination promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.

Parental Socialization

Another mechanism potentially explaining religiosity in the second generation is the influence of parental efforts to transmit their beliefs to their children, producing a phenomenon of intergenerational faith transfer (Hunsberger and Brown 1984). The power of parental religious socialization among Muslim families has been well established in past research (Scourfield et al. 2013; Jacob and Kalter 2013; de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014; van de Pol and van Tubergen 2014; Soehl 2017*b*). Muslim families may emphasize religious transmission more strongly than Christian immigrant groups since they may perceive Catholicism and *laïcité*—two dominant forces in French culture and institutions—as threatening.

HYPOTHESIS 3.—Parental religious socialization promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.

Transnational Ties

The maintenance of transnational ties among the second generation can lead to cultural exposure to the country of origin, which can manifest itself in a stronger religious commitment if religion is salient there. The hybridization of migrant identities between “here” and “there” has been well theorized, albeit somewhat in parallel with the literature on assimilation (Glick-Schiller, Basch, and Szanton-Blanc 1995; Faist 2000). In the case of Muslims specifically, existing research notes a strong transnational identity orientation among many Muslim communities in Europe, and the historical role

of mosques and religious leaders funded by foreign governments encourages the maintenance of ties with the old country (Mandaville 2009; Laurence 2012). In France, past research suggests that Muslim families maintain particularly intense transnational relationships (Safi 2018). As such, transnational ties between Muslim communities in the old and new country can act as prisms for the transmission of cultural beliefs and norms contributing to a maintenance of the home country's religious culture.

HYPOTHESIS 4.—*Transnational ties to the country of origin promote higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

Replenished Religiosity

Recent insights on the importance of continuing waves of migration for the assimilation process constitute a fifth hypothesis for the puzzle of delayed religious assimilation. Mainly associated with the work of Jiménez (2010) on Mexican immigration in the United States, the replenishment hypothesis stipulates that a continuous wave of immigrants complicates the adaptation process for later-generation migrants, because it increases their interaction with the foreign-born who act as ethnically “authentic” ambassadors for the country of origin—in particular by delegitimizing the optional or symbolic ethnicity of later-generation migrants (Jiménez 2010).

This dovetails with extensive evidence of blocked spatial mobility among the second generation of African origins, who tend to grow up and stay in the same disadvantaged neighborhoods as their foreign-born parents (McAvay 2018; McAvay and Safi 2018). Meanwhile, a continuous influx of migrants from Muslim-majority countries provides extensive opportunities for exchange between recently arrived Muslim immigrants and more established migrants—including the French-born second generation—on the “true” practice of Islam and the most authentic way to be a Muslim, one presumably involving a high degree of religiosity imported from the context of origin and transmitted through social influence. In Germany, Kelek's (2011) work on imported brides from rural Turkey showcases the weight of continuous migration on the vitality of the culture of origin in segregated Turkish neighborhoods. A replenished religious culture can stall opportunities to craft a hybrid, possibly less intense religious practice borrowing elements from both the context of origin and the context of reception.

HYPOTHESIS 5.—*Continuous interaction with recent immigrants from Muslim-majority countries promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

It is useful to classify these hypotheses as capturing two types of mechanisms. On one hand, parental socialization (hypothesis 3) and transnational ties (hypothesis 4) reflect a dynamic of cultural importing, in which the religiosity differential is exogenous to the French context of reception. On the

other hand, the material insecurity (hypothesis 1), reactive religiosity (hypothesis 2), and replenished religiosity (hypothesis 5) hypotheses capture the influence of inequality and social closure in France, whereby the religiosity differential is endogenous to the context of reception. Parsing out the relative contribution of these mechanisms to the overall religiosity differential is an additional motivation of the current study.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

Theoretical Motivation

Earlier, Chicago school–inspired work has often envisioned assimilation as a unilinear process of incorporation into a culturally white, middle-class core (e.g., Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964) and received much criticism for its inherent ethnocentrism (Glazer 1993; Alba and Nee 2003). A key theoretical contribution of the next wave of theorizing on assimilation—namely, models proposed by segmented (Portes and Zhou 1993) and neoassimilation (Alba and Nee 2003)—was to emphasize the internal diversity of immigrant groups, who arrive with different endowments in various forms of capital and from different contexts of origin. Likewise, they emphasized that destination countries are not homogeneous societies but are, rather, divided along multiple lines of differentiation such as space, class, and race. In countries with a long immigration history such as France and the United States, the “mainstream” is often diverse and complex and so are assimilation trajectories (Alba and Nee 2003). Among European migration researchers, Vertovec’s (2007) theorizing on the internal complexity of immigrant groups along multiple axes of difference—which he called “superdiversity”—shared a similar emphasis on the importance of population heterogeneity for the study of migration and assimilation phenomena.

An explicit willingness to avoid essentializing minority and majority groups as homogeneous entities with static traits and culture is also commonplace in qualitative immigration research, where in addition to the theoretical impetuses outlined above, influential debates on the relationship between minority culture and poverty have turned intragroup heterogeneity into a recurrent empirical and rhetorical motif, for fear of engaging in racial stereotypes (Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010).³ In the case of Muslim populations specifically, a concern for essentialism and internal variation can be traced back to Said’s (1979) famous work on orientalism—the historical perception carried by Western artists and intellectuals of Middle Eastern societies as

³ To take just one influential and well-regarded example, Kasinitz et al. (2008, p. 23) write a preliminary caution in their introductory chapter of their study of the second generation

static and homogeneous in their difference, which Said saw as a precondition and justification for colonialism and cultural imperialism.

Despite what is virtually a theoretical consensus on the importance of intragroup heterogeneity, however, quantitative research routinely relies on samples split by ethnically, racially, or religiously defined immigrant groups as the key categories of analysis. The “general linear reality”—a view of the social world turning groupness into a fixed attribute—and average case focus of regression-based approaches (Abbott 1988) tend to flatten the social structure of the groups under study and cumulatively contribute to reifying them when the assimilation of various groups is compared side by side in what FitzGerald (2014) has called an “ethnoracial Olympics.” This is because analyses from samples split by ethnic or religious categories yield single estimates depicting a homogeneous picture of group-level processes (Ragin 2000). Relatedly, much if not all existing work on the adaptation of Muslim immigrants and their children in Europe implicitly conceives of bounded, homogeneous Muslim groups amid a national, similarly bounded and homogeneous mainstream (see Voas and Fleischmann [2012] and Drouhot and Nee [2019] for reviews).

Such a “methodological Islamism” (Brubaker 2013) taking Muslims and other religious categories as the main categories of analysis might be problematic for two reasons. First, researching and accumulating findings on “Muslims” risks unwitting participation among social scientists in political projects depending on essentializing Muslims as one bounded and solidary entity. Second, a concern for heterogeneity is also analytical: single estimates from samples split by religious affiliation might subsume different processes under a single average. Taken together, these concerns call for a new analytical approach for the quantitative study of cultural difference.

Technical Implementation: The Inductive Subgroup Comparison Approach

To translate these theoretical considerations for reflexivity and heterogeneity into empirical practice, I propose a new empirical strategy: the inductive subgroup comparison approach (ISCA). ISCA is an empirical application of

in New York City: “We further recognize it is possible to read group comparisons as stereotypes or even racist generalizations. Let us be clear: any reference to group differences makes groups appear more homogeneous than they actually are. Our young respondents belonged not only to ethnic groups but also to social classes, genders, social groups, and neighborhoods. Like all modern people, they had a multiplicity of interacting social roles and identities. Although a quick reading of a table comparing groups will not always make this apparent, we have tried to remain sensitive to individual variation without losing sight of the real differences that ethnicity makes.”

fuzzy logic (Ragin 2000) to the study of assimilation. It relies on a mixture of fuzzy clustering, Monte Carlo simulation, and regression analysis to assess immigrant and native groups as socially comparable subgroups. ISCA consists of three distinct methodological steps. Through fuzzy cluster analysis—a family of data partitioning techniques from the larger umbrella of unsupervised machine learning (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2005; Molina and Garip 2019)—the first step is to inductively identify the key subgroups within the native population. These subgroups organize the assimilation process into distinct pathways. In a second step, immigrants are assigned to one of the subgroups making up the native population on the basis of social similarity. In a third step, I test our hypotheses and model assimilation outcomes of interest in these matched immigrant-native subgroups. Thus, ISCA effectively switches the relevant categories of analysis in the assimilation process from nominal (here, religious) groups to data-driven subgroups and allows for within- as well as the more traditional between-group comparisons.⁴ Figure 3 compares ISCA with the traditional focus on assimilation as between groups where groups are nominal.

ISCA allows for the study of distinct assimilation pathways by taking intragroup heterogeneity among both natives and immigrants into account and is characterized by three key features. It is inductive, insofar as subgroups of interest emerge from the data rather than preconceptions from the researcher. This is a point worth emphasizing: I could decide to compare low-income immigrants to low-income natives, for example. But I cannot, by definition, know in advance whether income is the right dimension to organize our comparison. Additionally, it is possible for several dimensions (income, gender, age, urban location, etc.) to consolidate into subgroups (Blau 1974). In other words, what matters for group heterogeneity may well be specific configurations of variables rather than specific variables. ISCA relies on the inherent reflexivity afforded by unsupervised machine-learning approaches: while domain-specific knowledge remains key to interpreting results, researchers need not impose assumptions about the structure of the data or the analytical appropriateness of a given social category in organizing heterogeneity within the data.

Second, ISCA is probabilistic because it does not rely on “hard” clustering assignment (such as that obtained with k-means clustering), where observations can belong to one cluster only, as such an approach would lead to reifying subgroups themselves and possibly overstating cross-cluster differences.⁵ Rather, it relies on fuzzy clustering, where membership in each cluster is

⁴ By “nominal,” I mean a group entity designated through a commonsense category. I do not mean “nominal” in a statistical sense, as in “nominal variable.”

⁵ I thank an *AJS* reviewer for pointing out that problem in an earlier version of this manuscript.




FIG. 3.—Comparison between assimilation through a nominal group approach (*top*) and assimilation among multiple subgroups in ISCA (*bottom*). Between-group analysis occurs with arrows within each lettered circle, while within-group differences in assimilation pathways are expressed with links between lettered circles. Color version available online.

uncertain and expressed through a membership score, which is then used to assign cases to groups in a stochastic and thus truly probabilistic manner. Finally, ISCA is iterative. As there exists significant uncertainty around subgroup boundaries (as expressed by membership scores from fuzzy clustering that are balanced), results following stochastic assignment may misrepresent the underlying uncertainty about cluster membership when membership is assigned only once. Thus, ISCA relies on Monte Carlo simulation and multiple iterations of the assignment and modeling steps (steps 2 and 3) to obtain stable results. Rather than a statistical or analytical nuisance, our procedure hence regards assignment uncertainty as meaningful as it reflects the blurry boundaries between ideal-typical subgroups making up the native and immigrant categories of interest.

The ISCA procedure extends past empirical work employing cluster analysis for the study of immigration and immigrant reception phenomena. For instance, Garip (2016) used k-means clustering to identify distinct types of Mexican migrants and carried within-cluster analyses, but she did so through a hard clustering procedure that may overstate cross-cluster differences. Bail (2008) used fuzzy clustering to identify new configurations of immigration attitudes across European countries, but he nevertheless relied on the highest membership score to assign cases to groups. Additionally, his study did not provide a way to reconcile within-cluster analyses with a fuzzy approach. ISCA builds on and extends these approaches with an iterative stochastic assignment procedure that allows for modeling within each cluster while retaining fuzziness and uncertainty around cross-cluster boundaries. More generally, ISCA and other related approaches showcase the potential of unsupervised machine-learning methods (Molina and Garip 2019) to detect latent groups and achieve an epistemological break (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) in order to study group-level processes without reliance on homogenizing, “groupist” (Brubaker 2004) categories of analysis (ethnic, religious, etc.).

ISCA Step 1: Identifying Heterogeneity in the Mainstream through Fuzzy Clustering

In the first step, I identify and choose variables that are known to be associated with religiosity from past research: gender (Miller and Hoffman 1995), age (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999), education (Albrecht and Heaton 1984), family income (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013), urbanicity (living in a city that is 100,000+; Finke and Stark 1988), and professional status (working a job or not; Chadwick and Garrett 1995; Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013).⁶ Thus, I do not divide up a native sample directly in terms of religiosity but demographic variables that are known to be related to it. I do so because finding variation on variables not included in the identification of a typology is typically used as a substantive validity check in clustering- and latent class analysis-based studies (Garip 2016; Drouhot and Garip, forthcoming). More importantly, these variables also capture broader variation in structural positions and life conditions—the “panoply of circumstances that define the quality and character of our social lives” (Weeden and Grusky 2005, p. 143). Through cluster analysis on these variables, I aim to capture the consolidated parameters of the social structure—that is, the patterned but nonintuitive interrelations of various forms of social differentiation (Blau 1974)—making up the “mainstream.” Uncovering such social structure through regression

⁶ I transform continuous variables in dummies (coded 0 for values below the median and 1 for values above) to avoid an arbitrary weighting of attributes due to different scales, which would affect the clustering results in undesirable ways.

modeling alone is theoretically possible with multiple interaction terms, but this approach would quickly run into untenable issues of data sparsity and is not desirable or practical when consolidation patterns are not known a priori.

To obtain subgroups in the sample of French natives, I employ the fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm (Bezdek, Ehrlich, and Full 1984), which minimizes the objective function:

$$\sum_i \sum_j w_i u_{ij}^m d_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where d is the Manhattan distance (dissimilarity) between observation i and the center of cluster j , u_{ij} is the membership of observation i in cluster j , and w_i is the degree of membership of observation i . The term w_i is the critical feature of fuzzy clustering since it makes cluster membership a continuous rather than a binary variable as found in hard clustering. The degree of membership of observation i in cluster j is given by

$$w_{ij} = \frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^c (\|x_i - c_j\| / \|x_i - c_k\|)^{2/(m-1)}}, \quad (2)$$

where m is the so-called fuzzifier—a value larger than 1 determining the extent of overlap between clusters.⁷ Each individual observation receives k membership scores, where k is the number of clusters. Membership scores range from 0 to 1, and the sum of each individual's membership scores adds up to 1. If all individuals have a very high probability of belonging to only one cluster, then fuzzy and hard clustering do not differ much. However, if membership probabilities are balanced across clusters, hard clustering may result in arbitrary group assignments. This cannot be known a priori and further motivates our reliance on fuzzy rather than hard clustering.

ISCA Step 2: Stochastic Assignment to a Subgroup

Once each individual from the native group has received k membership scores, cluster assignment A for respondent i is given by

$$A_i \sim \text{Multinomial}(\mathbf{p}_i), \quad (3)$$

where $\mathbf{p}_i = \{p_{i1}, p_{i2}, \dots, p_{ik}\}$ and $A_i \in \{1, 2, \dots, k\}$, with vector \mathbf{p}_i being respondent i 's probabilities of belonging to each cluster, obtained in step 1. The

⁷ A value of 1 effectively makes fuzzy c-means equivalent to hard k-means. I find that values lower than 1.3 tend to excessively decrease standard errors in subsequent regression analyses, and vice versa, and result in excessive noise at higher values, although heterogeneity patterns remain analogous. Hence, I set the fuzzifier m at 1.5, which is typical of the range of values in the literature (Schwämmle and Jensen 2010; Huang et al. 2012).




FIG. 4.—Intuitive logic and sources of variation across iterations in steps 1 and 2 of the ISCA as seen through a toy example. Color version available online.

random draw from the multinomial distribution \mathbf{p} is what makes cluster assignment truly probabilistic.⁸ Nonnative respondents' membership scores are calculated using equation (2) weighting membership on the basis of distance from centers in natives' clusters and stochastically assigned to a cluster of reference based on \mathbf{p}_i .

ISCA assesses uncertainty arising from stochastic clustering assignment via Monte Carlo simulation. In particular, I repeat the process described above $d = 500$ times, producing varying cluster assignments at the individual level—according to the underlying probabilities \mathbf{p} —and thus changing the within- and between-group compositions on which ulterior analyses are based at each iteration.⁹ Figure 4 summarizes the iterative and probabilistic approach of steps 1 and 2 of the ISCA procedure.

At step 1, constitutive subgroups in the native population are identified, and individuals in the data are assigned membership scores adding up to 1 (referred to as \mathbf{p} above and coming from a multinomial distribution). At step 2, several random draws result in different cluster compositions, as seen in the gray and black cases in group 1 at draw 1 and in separate groups at draw 2. This is because the gray case has a more balanced set of membership scores, making him or her more unstable in subgroup assignment across iterations. The procedure is repeated for immigrants by calculating membership scores and drawing d random assignments.

⁸ Conversely, a model assignment simply taking the highest membership value from \mathbf{p} would remain deterministic and analogous to hard clustering.

⁹ I find $d = 500$ to be a good trade-off between reliability and stability, on one hand, and computational power and processing time, on the other hand. Results with d set at 1,000 are substantively identical.

ISCA Step 3: Within-Cluster Modeling of Assimilation Outcomes and Cross-Group Comparisons

Step 3 consists of within-cluster modeling of assimilation outcomes of interest, with all models estimated across d iterations and k clusters, yielding $dk + 1$ sets of estimates—including one general model pooling all observations across clusters. Quantities of interest for cross-group comparison are the net difference in the outcomes of interest expressed by dummies for immigrant-religion groups and the interaction terms by immigrant-religion groups. Within-group heterogeneity is expressed by cross-cluster differences in terms of statistical significance for the variables of interest. In its emphasis on subgroup-level processes, ISCA preserves a focus on social structure, which would typically get lost in an approach relying on matching on the individual level, such as propensity score matching. Through d iterations of steps 2 and 3, ISCA produces an empirical distribution of estimates from which I report average values for the parameters and 95% confidence intervals from the Monte Carlo standard errors.

DATA AND MEASUREMENTS

Data

I use data from the complete module of the Trajectoires et Origines survey (TeO), a high-quality, representative survey of immigrant populations with a large native reference sample ages 18–60 in France, which was carried out by the French census bureau in cooperation with the National Demographic Institute (Institut national d'études démographiques, or INED). Its comprehensive set of covariates allows for a simultaneous testing of the hypotheses proposed above. The TeO survey was designed to fill a historical gap in France, where the gathering and use of ethnic and religious statistics has been illegal in the past (Simon 2008). The data-gathering process occurred in 2008–9, and the data were released in 2011 (Beauchemin, Hamel, Simon 2016). The response rate for the survey was 58%, yielding a sample of 21,137 respondents. The sample features 5,706 immigrant-origin respondents identifying as Muslim (58% foreign-born, 42% second generation), 4,496 immigrant-origin respondents identifying as Catholic (49% foreign-born, 51% second generation), 4,549 immigrant-origin respondents declaring no religion (35% foreign-born, 65% second generation), as well as smaller groups of individuals identifying as Protestant or simply Christian.¹⁰ The

¹⁰ While all analyses include the latter two groups, I do not present or discuss results for nonreligious and Christian groups here so as not to overburden the article. Furthermore, the results of statistical models of religiosity for irreligious groups are not very meaningful, while the Christian group is too small to carry within-cluster analyses as done below. My analyses focus on the Muslim populations, which I compare with Catholic immigrants. Of the Muslim respondents in TeO, 99.6% are either first- or second-generation immigrants.

sample also features 4,179 respondents coded “natives” (i.e., born in France of French-born parents), out of which approximately 59% declare having a religion.

Dependent Variables of Interest: TeO Items on Religiosity and Religious Practice

The key dimension of assimilation this study focuses on is religion. The TeO survey features four items measuring different aspects of religiosity and religious practice: the subjective importance of religion in the respondent’s life (not, somewhat, quite, or very important), the frequency at which the respondent follows his or her religion’s dietary constraints and guidelines (never because there is none, never, sometimes, and always), the frequency of religious service attendance (never, only for important family events or holidays, once or twice a month, or at least once a week), and whether the respondent wears a visible religious sign (never, sometimes, or always). I coded those responses using an incremental three-point scheme on a 0–2 scale to avoid inconsistency across items in the original survey, with 0 capturing “not” and “never” responses, 1 capturing intermediate responses, and 2 capturing the “always” and “very important” responses. The analyses below use both isolated items and an additive eight-point scale.

Individuals who do not report a religion were given a 0 score for all dimensions. Additionally, to include individuals who gave up their parents’ religion and to avoid attrition bias due to secularization across generations, I coded individuals who do not declare a religion but who report their parents as having a religion 0 from that particular religion. For instance, an individual who declares no religion but who reports one or both parents being Muslim will be coded Muslim with a score of 0 across all dimensions.¹¹

Predictors of Interest

Hypothesis 1: material insecurity.—I measure material insecurity with two independent variables: family income standardized by the number of consumption units (1 for the first adult, 0.5 for each additional adult, and 0.3 for each other person younger than 14) and the respondent’s subjective categorization of his or her standard of living as either “comfortable” or “difficult.”

Hypothesis 2: reactive religiosity.—A question on the respondent’s opinion about the frequency of discrimination in France yields a variable measuring the perception of discrimination (low or high). Second, I use a variable

¹¹ In case of religiously mixed parents, I coded these individuals by the father’s religion.

capturing the self-report of discrimination on the basis of nationality or “origins” present in the discrimination module of the TeO survey. I find this general formulation to strike a good balance for the self-report of discrimination related to the migration experience (as opposed to discrimination related to the respondent’s gender or disability status) while not being overtly focused on the respondent’s religion, which could lead to primarily measuring the experience of discrimination among those who are “visibly” Muslim (e.g., those who wear a religious sign).¹²

Hypothesis 3: parental socialization.—To measure the influence of parental socialization on current religious identity and practices, I use the respondent’s answer to a question about the importance of religion in the education received from parents (not at all, somewhat, quite, or very important), which I turn into a binary variable (low and high religious socialization).

Hypothesis 4: transnational ties.—For transnational ties, I use a dummy variable measuring whether the respondent maintains friendships or family ties in the country of origin. To have a comparative measure for the native population, I consider ties to *outré-mer* territories (the DOM-TOM) as constituting transnational ties since they resemble migrants’ typical long-distance ties.

Hypothesis 5: replenished religiosity.—I measure opportunities for interaction with recently arrived migrants from Muslim countries with two dummy variables on neighborhood context. These dummy variables indicate whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood located in the top decile at the national level for the percentage of first-generation migrants from North Africa (corresponding to 40% or more) and sub-Saharan Africa (19% or more). The neighborhood composition comes from census data included in the TeO survey. French neighborhoods as defined by the French census are much smaller than American census tracts, comprising around 2,000 people on average, and constitute good proxies for neighborhoods. As for using immigrants as a measure of Muslim religious presence, North Africa has historically been almost entirely Muslim, and sub-Saharan African immigration in France comes mostly from the Sahel region, comprising countries such as Senegal and Mali that feature large Muslim majorities among their populations (Lagrange 2013).

Other controls.—In addition to the hypothesized predictors of interest, I control for age, squared age, gender, and educational attainment (measured as one of eight categories in the French education system, such as *baccalauréat général* [general track in high school] or *licence* [bachelor’s degree]).

¹² I thank an *AJS* reviewer for pointing this out and suggesting a more general measurement for the reactive religiosity hypothesis.

TABLE 1
EMPIRICAL MEAN VALUES FOR VARIABLES OF INTEREST IN THE ANALYTICAL
SAMPLE OF MUSLIM RESPONDENTS

Cluster Assignment	Working Class	Peripheral Petite Bourgeoisie	Urban Middle Class+	Socially Dependent
Proportion second generation33	.37	.52	.52
Subjective religiosity (0–2)	1.29	1.20	1.20	1.32
Following dietary constraints (0–2)	1.56	1.46	1.44	1.61
Proportion living in 100,000+ city80	.39	.80	.77
Proportion working a job70	.69	.74	.35
Proportion female37	.47	.40	.64
Age (18–60)	39.91	38.03	32.65	30.83
Proportion with high school degree or more19	.27	.70	.22
Household income in thousands of euros (0–120)	11.90	15.43	18.69	10.81
Proportion reporting subjective hardship36	.27	.19	.37
Proportion perceiving high level of discrimination47	.49	.55	.50
Proportion reporting discrimination within last five years21	.23	.30	.28
Proportion reporting high importance of religion in parental education48	.44	.41	.47
Proportion reporting transnational ties75	.74	.70	.72
Proportion living in top decile for percentage of North African immigrants43	.35	.34	.45
Proportion living in top decile for percentage of sub-Saharan African immigrants27	.16	.26	.25
Count	1,580.66	685.17	1,124.17	1,985.01

NOTE.—Average, unweighted values by cluster for variables of interest in the final analytical sample used for all models presented (ISCA step 3) among Muslim respondents. The results are averages for cluster means obtained from $d = 500$ iterations of stochastic assignment based on the \mathbf{p} vector of membership probabilities (ISCA step 2). Most cross-cluster differences are statistically significant, and hence empirical standard deviations are not reported. Counts are not round values because of averaging the number of respondents in each cluster across iterations.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the analytical sample of Muslim respondents. Table D2 features a similar table for all respondents across nativity and religion.

RESULTS

Identification of Social Structure in Sample of French Natives

Table 2 reports results from a four-cluster solution from fuzzy clustering found to best fit the sample of French native respondents. I selected the four-cluster solution after a series of six diagnostic tests (reported in detail in app. B) suggested it is substantially better than a three-cluster one and

TABLE 2
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF FRENCH NATIVE POPULATION

Cluster Assignment	Working Class	Peripheral Petite Bourgeoisie	Urban Middle Class+	Socially Dependent
Proportion female42 (.01)	.49 (.01)	.42 (.01)	.54 (.01)
Age	44.58 (.23)	42.99 (.25)	35.97 (.16)	29.86 (.25)
Proportion with high school degree or more17 (.01)	.16 (.01)	.81 (.01)	.27 (.01)
Per person household income in thousands of euros	15.36 (.19)	21.23 (.23)	25.65 (.16)	13.68 (.20)
Proportion living in 100,000+ city52 (.01)	.25 (.01)	.65 (.01)	.63 (.01)
Proportion working a job90 (.01)	.91 (.01)	.90 (.00)	.36 (.01)
Count	970.64 (19.64)	839.88 (19.15)	1,185.05 (16.65)	827.44 (16.77)

NOTE.—Average values by cluster for variables used in fuzzy clustering (ISCA step 1). The results are averages for means obtained from $d = 500$ iterations of stochastic assignment based on the \mathbf{p} vector of membership probabilities (ISCA step 2), with standard deviations arising from assignment variation in parentheses. See ISCA steps 1 and 2 for more details.

is as well delineated as the less parsimonious five- and six-cluster ones. Importantly, the clusters are meaningful (Grimmer and King 2010)—forming easily identifiable segments of the French population—and highly differentiated, as indicated by small Monte Carlo errors.¹³

Native French are segmented into subgroups that are readily identifiable in terms of social class. This is an inductive discovery: while they could have theoretically done so, gender and age do not meaningfully structure heterogeneity within the data, which showcases the reflexivity vis-à-vis social categories afforded by unsupervised machine learning. Cluster 1 features older individuals who have low earnings and low educational attainment but are nevertheless employed—forming a clear “working class” cluster. Cluster 2 is made up of working individuals with a low education and intermediate income level. The occupational structure of this group—which I label “peripheral

¹³ Monte Carlo error refers to the standard deviation in mean values in each variable and cluster, across d iterations. It is the variation that comes from the change in cluster composition across d random draws from \mathbf{p} . As such, it does not capture variation within clusters but variation across iterations (step 2). See app. C for more details on overlap and uncertainty across iterations of assignment based on random draws from the multinomial distribution \mathbf{p} .




FIG. 5.—Religiosity across native subgroups. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo errors. Color version available online.

petite bourgeoisie” to acknowledge its location outside large cities—encompasses low-ranking employees and civil servants who are more senior than those of cluster 1, as well as retirees. Cluster 3 contains socially advantaged individuals with higher human and economic capital residing in cities—the middle class and beyond, which I label “urban middle class+.” Finally, cluster 4 encompasses younger, poorer natives who are not integrated in labor markets. A closer look at its occupational structure reveals that it features the homemakers and the unemployed respondents of the sample.¹⁴ I label this group “socially dependent.”

Does the internal social differentiation of the native French population translate into diverse religiosity levels? Figure 5 reports the mean religiosity score for the four subgroups making up the native population.

Despite an overall consensus in the population toward low religiosity, the working class subgroup is noticeably higher. Pairwise *t*-tests (not shown) reveal that the working class significantly differs in religiosity from all other groups and that both cluster 2 (peripheral petite bourgeoisie) and cluster 3 (urban middle class+) also differ significantly from cluster 4 (socially dependent). Such variation is consequential to measure the extent of the religiosity

¹⁴ Tables showing the occupational structure of the obtained clusters are not shown here but are available on request.

differential between French natives and Muslims of immigrant origins. If many more Muslim individuals are in the socially dependent group, for instance, this might make them more culturally heterodox in terms of religiosity than those in the working class subgroup. The magnitude of the religiosity differential depends on the subgroup of reference constituting the baseline religiosity level that assimilation is measured against.

Assignment Results and Sociodemographic Heterogeneity among First- and Second-Generation Muslims

Figure 6 presents the results of matching Muslim respondents in the TeO survey to their socially most proximate subgroup within the native population using the same probabilistic procedure of stochastic assignment across iterations. Muslims in France are socially much more diverse than depicted in the literature. The “socially dependent” category comprises the largest group, and much ethnographic effort has been expanded to describe the lives of the foreign-born (e.g., Lagrange 2013) and second generation (e.g., Marlière 2008) falling in that category. By comparison, far less is known on the working class and peripheral petite bourgeoisie subgroups, while an emergent literature studies the social experience of the rising immigrant elite belonging in the middle class and beyond subgroup (e.g., Waldring 2018; Drouhot 2020a). Such sociodemographic heterogeneity, and its implications for research on Muslims in general, has rarely been acknowledged or studied.

Structure of the Muslim-Native Religiosity Differential

Figure 7 plots the net differential in religiosity from natives for second-generation Muslim respondents across subgroups. The cumulative religiosity




FIG. 6.—Membership percentages in each cluster for the Muslim population, by generation and averaged across 500 iterations. The shares are weighted with sampling weights. Color version available online.




FIG. 7.—Structure of the religiosity differential between second-generation Muslims and natives in France, by subgroup. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo errors. Color version available online.

score is an additive score composed of the four dimensions—subjective religiosity, religious attendance, following of religiously imposed dietary constraints, and wearing of a religious sign, all on a three-point scale (0–2) as described above.

Figure 7 yields two substantive results. First, the aggregate differential is mainly accounted for by differentials on two dimensions of religiosity—subjective religiosity, on one hand, and the following of dietary constraints, on the other. Conversely, and contrary to the impression one might derive from long-standing societal debates regarding the construction of mosques and legislation on the veil (Bowen 2007), French-born Muslims are not strongly differentiated from native French by their higher propensity to wear visible religious signs or attend religious service. Second, the second generation's degree of difference from their native counterparts is heterogeneous across subgroups, which directly relates to the different baseline religiosity levels among the native French population documented in figure 5. Respondents from the socially dependent subgroups are consistently farther away from native religiosity levels than Muslims in other groups. Likewise, respondents in the urban middle class and beyond experience higher levels of departure from native levels of religiosity. In other words, the religiosity differential is polarized between Muslim subgroups at the opposite end of the social spectrum. This finding complements existing ethnographic work on the lives of socially disadvantaged second-generation Muslims (Lepoutre 1997; Marlière 2008; Kepel 2012*a*), as well as emerging qualitative work on the subjective experience of cultural difference among the new Muslim middle class and the challenges associated with reconciling class and religious identities (Waldring 2018; Drouhot 2020*a*). A similar graph for foreign-born (first-generation) Muslims shows very similar results, albeit with less heterogeneity across clusters.¹⁵

To sum up, results from fuzzy clustering and probabilistic assignment (ISCA steps 1 and 2) show that there exist four native subgroups at the intersection of major sociodemographic variables that are known to shape religiosity and broader structural patterns of variation within French society. Accordingly, and despite an overall cultural consensus in the population around low religiosity, these subgroups nevertheless differ in religiosity—the key outcome of interest in this study. Probabilistic assignment of Muslim respondents to a socially proximate subgroup shows considerable sociodemographic heterogeneity across immigrant generations, which in turn is associated with different magnitudes in the religiosity differential, with second-generation Muslims in the urban middle class and socially dependent subgroups being especially more religious than natives across all religiosity dimensions. In spite of this variation, the second generation as a whole tends

¹⁵ These results are not shown here because of space constraints but are available on request.

to be more religious than French natives in terms of subjective religiosity and following religiously imposed dietary constraints but much less so in terms of religious attendance and the wearing of conspicuous religious signs.

Sources of the Religiosity Differential: Results from Within-Cluster Regression Models

In the models that follow, I test the five hypotheses by modeling religiosity by subgroup (i.e., cluster), as well as present results for a similar model for all respondents pooled together. This allows us to compare results from ISCA with results from the traditional nominal group approach.

I focus on separately modeling subjective religiosity and the following of dietary constraints as the two main sources of the aggregate differential in religiosity. Each model includes natives and second-generation immigrants who are Muslim, Catholic, simply Christian, or nonreligious. I also present and discuss supplementary results from models including foreign-born respondents. The key quantities of interest to my research question are the coefficients for the dummy variables by immigrant-religion group taking natives as the baseline and capturing variation in religiosity not accounted for by other statistical controls, the main terms corresponding to the predictors of interest, as well as their interaction terms to examine how their statistical effects vary by immigrant-religion group. While I talk of processes, explanations, and effects to designate statistical effects, I do not mean causal effects or processes. Some of the mechanisms hypothesized to be at work are causal in nature, but none of the statistical relationships I describe to test our hypotheses are causal, even though I present and interpret findings with a language that may, at times, imply causality. This constitutes a key limitation of the research design that I discuss in more detail below.

Upon examining these coefficients, I compare them between as well as within groups—that is, across subgroups within each nominal religious group. I present results for Catholic immigrants for the sake of comparison and also because their size is roughly equivalent with Muslims in the sample, while Protestant and other Christian groups are much smaller. To facilitate comparison between and within religious immigrant groups, I present all regression results as visualizations (Kastellec and Leoni 2007).

Modeling Subjective Religiosity

Figure 8 presents selected regression coefficients for ordinary least squares models of subjective religiosity, by subgroup and a general, pooled model with all respondents together (*top, in red*).¹⁶ I first discuss the significance

¹⁶ Coefficients for demographic controls and certain groups such as Christian and nonreligious immigrants are not shown. The full graphs are available on request.




FIG. 8—Regression model coefficients of subjective religiosity, by subgroups as well as one pooled model among second-generation and native respondents. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo standard errors. The model also includes interaction effects for immigrants identifying as Protestant, Christian, and nonreligious (not shown). All models include sampling weights and controls for gender, age, squared age, and education (not shown).

of the “net surplus” term for Muslims and then discuss each interaction term for Muslim respondents and compare these to the main terms and the interactions terms for Catholics. The net surplus designates the quantity of subjective religiosity among Muslims that is not accounted for by other variables included in the model. Crucially, the top red coefficient indicates that a pooled model across all respondents shows no religiosity differential net of all controls included in the model since the error bar overlaps with zero. Comparing this pooled coefficient with coefficients from within-cluster analyses, however, we see that the pooled coefficient hides a net positive differential among two subgroups—namely, the socially dependent and the urban middle class+. Meanwhile, the coefficients for the working class and peripheral petite bourgeoisie overlap with zero, indicating that there exists no significant difference between Muslims and natives once variables relating to our hypotheses and other controls are introduced. This is a substantively important result. A nominal group approach would yield an average result showing all second-generation Muslims to have no religiosity differential net of controls. Instead, within-group estimates obtained from ISCA show that unexplained cultural difference exists but only for two Muslim subgroups for whom the differential is quite high given that the scale runs from 0 to 2. Comparing these coefficients to the Catholic second generation, we see that our model performs better among Muslims than Catholics, as the latter has a higher and more consistent religiosity differential net of controls.

Switching to the main as well as the interaction terms, we find support for hypothesis 1 through the negative association of income and religiosity among Muslims, but this association holds only among the socially dependent and the urban middle class+. It appears only among Muslims, as it is not present in the main terms or among Catholics. Somewhat curiously, the association between subjective hardship and religiosity is in the opposite direction to what I hypothesized. Hypothesis 2 also finds support with an association between both perception and report of discrimination and subjective religiosity among Muslims. These statistical effects are heterogeneous across subgroups however: a high level of perception of discrimination has the expected effect in all groups except the peripheral petite bourgeoisie, and the association between reports of discrimination and religiosity observed in the pooled sample is entirely carried by the urban middle class subgroup. I also find support for both hypothesis 3 on parental socialization and hypothesis 4 on transnational ties, but these variables are at work among all groups and not just Muslims, as indicated by the large effects in the main terms. The association documented in earlier work (e.g., Soehl 2017b) regarding the strength of Muslim parental socialization on religiosity appears only among the urban middle class. Finally, figure 8 also suggests a rather uniform process of replenished religiosity through contact with the foreign-born from North Africa, and to a lesser extent sub-Saharan Africa, but the statistical

relationship between the presence of African immigrants and subjective religiosity only occurs among the socially dependent.

Summing up, Muslims differ from natives in terms of subjective religiosity, but this is true only of those in the socially dependent and urban middle class subgroups. Overall, I find some degree of support—depending on the share of significant and nonsignificant effects across Muslim subgroups—for the five hypotheses. While reported discrimination has a very strong association with religiosity among some subgroups of Catholic immigrants as well, both perception of discrimination and income have the expected relationship with religiosity among Muslims only. Transnational ties and parental socialization are at play among all religious groups.

Modeling the Following of Religiously Imposed Dietary Constraints

Figure 9 shows results from a similar modeling approach for the other dimension of religiosity on which second-generation Muslims stand out compared to native French—namely, the following of dietary constraints imposed by their religion. Figure 9 reveals a large, consistent differential with natives net of all controls. Muslims' differential is also higher than Catholics. In part, this likely has to do with the more explicitly dietary rules imposed by Islam on aspects such as alcohol consumption and eating *halal* (licit) foods compared to Catholicism and other Christian religions, although fasting is widespread in several branches of Christianity as well. Consistent with the results from models of subjective religiosity, the urban middle class and socially dependent Muslim subgroups have higher levels of cultural heterodoxy as expressed by higher differentials net of controls, compared to the working class and peripheral petite bourgeoisie, when it comes to following religious dietary constraints.

Nevertheless, I find some support for all five hypotheses as seen in the consistently positive statistical effects of the interaction for Muslims compared to the main terms and the interaction terms for Catholics. I find a negative relationship of income, as perception and report of discrimination with the following of dietary constraints. General perception of discrimination is positively related to following religious dietary constraints among the second generation, but the effect is carried by the working class. Likewise, the effect one would find in a pooled sample for report of interpersonal discrimination is driven by the social experience of the peripheral petite bourgeoisie and the urban middle class subgroups. Parental socialization and transnational ties have a strong relationship with the following of dietary constraints among all respondents and an even stronger one among all Muslim subgroups except the working class (for parental socialization) and the peripheral petite bourgeoisie (for transnational ties). Finally, I find the same positive relationship between that form of religiosity and the high presence of Maghribi and




FIG. 9.—Regression model coefficients of following religiously imposed dietary constraints, by subgroups as well as one pooled model among second-generation and native respondents. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo standard errors. The model also includes interaction effects for immigrants identifying as Protestant, Christian, and nonreligious (not shown). All models include sampling weights and controls for gender, age, and education (not shown).

sub-Saharan African immigrants in the neighborhood as I did in the case of subjective religiosity.

Predictive Profiles and Decomposition of the Religiosity Differential among the Second Generation

In order to measure the magnitude and predictive power of the independent variables and parse out their relative influence in shaping delayed religious assimilation among the second generation, I computed predicted religiosity values for two profiles based on the regression models presented earlier, across subgroups and our two religiosity dimensions of interest. In one profile, I set independent variables at values that are associated with higher religiosity—that is, lower income (25th percentile within the respondent's subgroup), high perception or report of discrimination, high emphasis on religion in parental socialization, holding transnational ties, and living in a neighborhood with a high presence of immigrants from North Africa. In the second profile, I set those variables at lower predictive values—that is, at 0 for binary variables and at the 75th percentile for income. All other variables are held at their




FIG. 10.—Predicted value for high and low predictive profiles for subjective religiosity among second-generation Muslims, with values for all other variables held at the mean. High profile features income set at 25th percentile, high perception and report of discrimination, high parental socialization, transnational ties, and living in neighborhoods with high presence of North African immigrants, and low profile features income set at 75th percentile and all other binary variables at 0. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals from Monte Carlo standard errors. Color version available online.




FIG. 11.—Predicted value for high and low predictive profiles for following religiously imposed dietary constraints among second-generation Muslims, with values for all other variables held at the mean. High profile features income set at 25th percentile, high perception and report of discrimination, high parental socialization, transnational ties, and living in neighborhoods with high presence of North African immigrants, and low profile features income set at 75th percentile and all other binary variables at 0. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals from Monte Carlo standard errors. Some values are higher than 2 because the prediction is linear. Color version available online.

means. Figures 10 and 11 depict the gap between the two predictive profiles, with the horizontal line being the mean predicted religiosity value for natives.

For both subjective religiosity and following dietary constraints, the “low” predicted values are statistically similar or even lower than native values, although a positive gap remains between natives and low predicted values for Muslims among the urban middle class and socially dependent for the following of dietary constraints. Nevertheless, the collapse in predicted religiosity values in the low profile suggests that our parsimonious set of predictors has strong explanatory power for the observed religiosity differential among the Muslim second generation. To gain further insight, it is useful to disaggregate the gap between the high and low profiles in the percentage change related to the statistical effect to each variable, across subgroups and religiosity dimensions. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the relative percentage change between the high and low predictive profiles following change in each predictor.

TABLE 3
 PERCENTAGE DECOMPOSITION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW PROFILES
 FOR SECOND-GENERATION MUSLIMS

	SUBJECTIVE RELIGIOSITY High-Low Δ	FOLLOWING DIETARY CONSTRAINTS High-Low Δ
C1, working class:		
Material insecurity	3.30	6.61
Discrimination	24.16	32.94
Parental socialization	41.97	25.68
Transnational ties	16.84	21.53
Replenishment	13.73	13.22
C2, peripheral petite bourgeoisie:		
Material insecurity	6.51	8.43
Discrimination	24.81	26.89
Parental socialization	39.41	32.84
Transnational ties	14.90	14.33
Replenishment	14.37	17.52
C3, urban middle class+:		
Material insecurity	5.94	9.16
Discrimination	20.46	26.04
Parental socialization	49.49	36.92
Transnational ties	9.96	13.38
Replenishment	14.15	14.51
C4, socially dependent:		
Material insecurity	5.49	9.04
Discrimination	22.51	28.05
Parental socialization	46.19	32.51
Transnational ties	14.58	14.91
Replenishment	11.23	15.49

NOTE.—Percentage decomposition of the difference between high and low profiles for predicted religiosity values, by dimension of religiosity and clusters for second-generation Muslim respondents. Percentages do not sum to 100 because of rounding.

For subjective religiosity among the second generation, variables capturing religiosity as a “cultural import” from the context of origin, namely, parental socialization and the maintenance of transnational ties, account for a majority of the difference between predictive profiles. Nevertheless, variables related to discrimination and replenishment account for a large portion of the variation—typically around 40%. This tendency is stronger in the case of dietary constraints, for which material insecurity, discrimination, and replenishment variables account for more than half of the change between predictive profiles. The weight of discrimination variables is particularly noteworthy, as they account for a fifth to a third of the gap in predictive profiles across clusters and religiosity dimensions.

A similar disaggregation exercise between predictive profiles based on models including both first- and second-generation Muslims shows notable differences, as parental socialization and transnational ties dominate in the

percentage change across subgroups and religiosity dimensions (see table D1 and figs. D1 and D2 for the full models).¹⁷ This comparison illustrates the larger weight of discrimination and replenishment variables for the second generation compared to the first generation, who largely imports high religiosity from the context of origin.

Overall, the high religiosity of the second generation appears as a relatively balanced mix of cultural import (family socialization, transnational ties) and response to inequality and social closure (poverty, discrimination, and replenishment) in France. As such, the puzzle of delayed religiosity is both exogenous and endogenous to the context of destination for second-generation Muslims in France: it is culturally imported and transmitted from contexts of higher religiosity in the origin countries and reproduced as a form of blocked acculturation (Wimmer and Soehl 2014) in response to social closure and inequality in the context of reception.

Supplementary Analyses

I recovered substantively similar subgroups in the native population of reference in ISCA step 1 with alternative data partitioning methods, namely, k-means clustering as well as latent class analysis, which bolsters my confidence in the internal validity of the results obtained with fuzzy clustering.¹⁸

Another series of robustness checks attempted to gauge the effect of selection in estimation of the effect of discrimination variables. More religious Muslims might be, for various reasons, more likely to be discriminated against in the first place, and this could confound the effect of discrimination. I thus ran separate models for individuals who never wore a religious sign to see whether the effects of discrimination variables were driven by those who always or sometimes wear a religious sign.¹⁹ Interaction terms for discrimination variables among Muslims in models restricted to those who never wear a religious sign remain significant and comparable to earlier models. Certain coefficients actually become statistically insignificant

¹⁷ I do not discuss these models including foreign-born Muslims further because of space constraints, but they show analogous results in general, the difference I mention here notwithstanding.

¹⁸ Note that k-means does not allow for the probabilistic assignment procedure I designed here because it is a hard clustering method in which belonging to clusters is a binary variable—hence, I do not rely on it here other than as a robustness check. Latent class analysis is closer in spirit to ISCA but more computationally intensive and less parsimonious as it is model and not algorithm based. Given the multistep approach in ISCA, I opted for the simpler method at step 1. All these alternative results through other methods are available on request.

¹⁹ I also attempted to obtain estimates for the net effect of discrimination using propensity score matching, but unfortunately the common support region to carry out the analyses was too small between the treated and untreated groups.

among those who never wear a religious sign. Overall, this indicates that the statistical relationships between perception and report of discrimination documented earlier are not driven by a subset of individuals who are more likely to perceive and report discrimination because they wear a visible religious sign. These models are available in figures D3 and D4.

Concerns for External Validity and Generalizability: Temporal and Geographic Scope of the Religiosity Differential in France and Beyond

There exist additional concerns for the external validity of our substantive results. First, the TeO item on religiously imposed dietary constraints may pick up specificity of Islamic dietary practices rather than religiosity per se, as Islam is one of the more constraining world religions in that regard. TeO is also a somewhat dated survey, as its fieldwork occurred in 2008 and 2009. Finally, it is possible that the religiosity surplus is a uniquely French social fact, given the specific history of religious wars and aggressive secularism that followed in the 20th century. To contextualize our documentation and analyses of the religiosity differential based on the French TeO survey, I use data from multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) containing differently worded questions on religiosity. Specifically, I focus on a religiosity dimension not present in TeO and arguably present among both Christian and Islamic religions, namely, praying. By focusing on the differential in praying behavior between natives and Muslim immigrants in France and other European countries, in periods leading up to and following 2008–9 when TeO was fielded, we can gain further appreciation of the external validity and generalizability of the findings from the current study.

Figure 12 plots proportions stating that they pray daily among first- and second-generation Muslims and French natives (of any religion), from ESS rounds carried out every two years between 2006 and 2018. A sizable gap between natives and Muslims is consistent across survey years, with a majority of self-identified first- and second-generation Muslims stating they pray daily and only a minority of natives stating the same. The native-immigrant religiosity ratio is comparable to what I documented earlier based on TeO, with Muslim immigrants' religiosity being several times higher in magnitude than natives. If anything, the religiosity differential increases over time. I thus gain further confidence that my results regarding the magnitude of the religiosity gap are not an artifact of specific survey questions or survey periods. To further contextualize my findings, figure 13 presents similar descriptive analyses in different European countries that also have sizable Muslim minorities.

As in France, a substantial immigrant-native gap in praying behavior exists across countries and survey years, albeit with variation in both dimensions. The proportions of Muslims stating that they pray daily are comparable




FIG. 12.—Religiosity differential in praying behavior in France. Source: ESS rounds 3–9. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Color version available online.




FIG. 13.—Religiosity differential in praying behavior in Western European countries. Source: ESS rounds 3–9. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Color version available online.

to France, in spite of different national contexts and migration histories. While the specifics of our ISCA analyses cannot be replicated for reasons of space and data, we nevertheless gain confidence that the religiosity differential is a general feature of contemporary migration societies in Western Europe and not just imputable to specifics of the TeO survey or the French context.

DISCUSSION

Taking Heterogeneity Seriously: Uncovering Subgroups and Parallel Social Processes

Theoretical work on immigration and incorporation has repeatedly emphasized the analytical importance of the internal diversity inherent to both native and immigrant groups (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 2003; Vertovec 2007). These concerns are also prominent in the work of Bourdieu-influenced scholars warning against “groupist” thinking and emphasizing the need for a reflexive use of social categories like ethnicity and religion in order to avoid accounts of bounded, homogenous, and solidary groups (Brubaker 2004, 2013; Wimmer 2013). These theoretical emphases on heterogeneity and reflexivity are the analytical counterpart to more political concerns about essentialist representations of the “other” in postcolonial theorizing (Said 1979) and the emerging scholarship on contemporary Islamophobia (Taras 2013). While qualitative inquiries on Islam in Europe have been attentive to these questions and careful not to assume Muslims form a bounded and homogeneous group (Bowen 2007, 2012; Kapko 2007; Kepel 2012*a*, 2012*b*; Beaman 2015*a*), quantitative scholars have methodologically assumed Muslims and Islam as relatively fixed entities through the production of statistical findings relying on single group-level estimates (see Voas and Fleischmann [2012] and Drouhot and Nee [2019] for reviews; for a critique of “methodological Islamism” specifically, see Brubaker [2013]).

The analytical approach I introduced and implemented is an attempt to translate these theoretical concerns for heterogeneity and reflexivity into methodological practice based on fuzzy logic. By relying on fuzzy clustering and Monte Carlo simulation, ISCA allows for the probabilistic study of intergroup difference and its determinants in terms of empirical subgroups making up nominal group categories. It thus produces an epistemological break to study immigrant groups without reliance on groupist categories of analysis (Brubaker 2004, 2013). As such, ISCA produces multiple estimates for each nominal group category under study, which allows for considerably more nuance when discussing assimilation trajectories in comparative perspectives. Net of controls, within-cluster regression models showed that a single, nominal group-level estimate of the religiosity differential would be misleading. In particular, results showed that urban middle class and socially

dependent subgroups consistently carried the single-group-level estimates upward, while the peripheral petite bourgeoisie and the working class were less different from natives in terms of religiosity—and sometimes not statistically different at all, as in the case of subjective religiosity. In other words, the single, average estimate hides considerable heterogeneity, and this matters because it would directly affect overall conclusion about the extent of Muslims' cultural difference in terms of religiosity. Given the politicization of Muslim populations as homogeneous and problematic cultural groups, I consider these results, as well as the methodological approach that led to them, to be timely and important. The code used in the analyses will be made available for reuse by the community of researchers, so that ISCA can be adapted to advance the study of assimilation and difference between heterogeneous groups in other empirical contexts.²⁰

In addition to providing a methodological response to theoretical concerns for essentialism, this strategy led to substantial analytical payoffs in its uncovering of different processes at work among different groups, as expressed by the varying statistical significance of coefficients across clusters. Thus, it is helpful to interpret and further contextualize these differences under the light of existing qualitative research. The socially dependent subgroup has been the subject of past ethnographic work focusing on the experience of marginalized second-generation Muslims—economically vulnerable individuals living in segregated neighborhoods who are well aware of the religious and spatial stigma affecting them (Lepoutre 1997; Franz 2007; Lapeyronnie 2008; Kepel 2012*a*; Lagrange 2013). Ethnographic work indicates that religiosity among these socially disadvantaged Muslims may act as a compensation for finding community and self-esteem in spite of perceived social exclusion (Khosrokhavar 1997; Kapko 2007). In particular, the combined effect sizes for income and replenishment variables are highest in that cluster for both subjective religiosity and following dietary constraints, which dovetails with ethnographic descriptions of the salience of religion in social norms and collective life in certain ethnically segregated neighborhoods in France known as the *banlieues* (Lepoutre 1997; Lapeyronnie 2008).²¹ In these neighborhoods, social disadvantage results in dense, local networks of coreligionists enforcing religious norms and identities through reputation dynamics and social pressure in the local community (Lapeyronnie 2008; Kepel 2012*a*), so that high religiosity constitutes a way to belong locally.

²⁰ The code is available on the author's personal website at lucasdrouhot.com.

²¹ This is indicated by the effect sizes in figs. 8 and 9, not by the percentage change in the decomposition from table 3, as the latter does not capture effect size but relative changes in the two predictive profiles.

At the opposite end of the social spectrum, recent research on the Muslim middle class in France can help us further understand the results for cluster 3. Through qualitative interviews with immigrant-origin professionals, Drouhot (2020a) identified a peculiar predicament among Muslim professionals, who reported high levels of religious stigma compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. These perceptions of being cultural outsiders because of their religion stemmed from the disconnect between their high levels of professional success and related but unmet expectations of fair treatment and high social status in their daily life. Likewise, Beaman's (2015a) interview study of middle class second-generation Muslims showcased this group's conscious effort to reconcile their religiosity and religious practices with being seen as French. Both studies described the negotiation of cultural difference among Muslim respondents who experienced upward mobility and desired to maintain their religious identity while leading middle or upper middle class lives. These qualitative findings directly relate to the strong statistical relationships I find between urban middle class Muslims' religiosity and their perception and self-report of discrimination, which is higher than among other subgroups. For this subgroup, higher levels of education and socioeconomic attainment translate into more acute perceptions of discrimination. In addition, one notes the stronger role of parental socialization among middle class and peripheral petit bourgeois respondents for subjective religiosity. This extends Soehl's (2017b) analyses based on similar data, which documented a strong interaction effect between socialization from Muslim parents and subjective religiosity. My approach, however, suggests that Soehl's results are driven by Muslim respondents with higher socioeconomic attainment (clusters 2 and 3 in my approach). Again, past ethnographic work helps make sense of this finding, as it tends to describe parental religious socialization as less forceful than in more disadvantaged (e.g., cluster 4) portions of the Muslim population. This leads middle class, second-generation Muslims to embrace their parents' heritage on their own terms, as a form of self-actualization (Beaman 2015a, pp. 52–55).

It is harder to contextualize the results of the working class and peripheral petite bourgeoisie Muslims because of the lack of existing research. The former is characterized by a strong effect of perception (but not self-report) of discrimination and the presence of Maghribi immigrants in the neighborhood. The latter shares some of statistical relationships documented among the urban middle class cluster, such as self-report of discrimination and the salient role of parental religious socialization. While past qualitative work focused on both ends of the class spectrum is helpful in interpreting our results, far less exists on these two subgroups in the intermediate social strata in French society. An added benefit of my analytical approach focused on heterogeneity is to point out this sizable but largely

unknown group of ordinary Muslims, who are not exceptional in their middle class status or in their degree of social disadvantage and who should be the object of future research focused on empirical subgroups existing below the nominal “Muslim” label.

The Social Fact of the Religiosity Surplus: Exogenously Imported and Endogenously Reproduced

Through decomposition of the change in predicted religiosity values, I showed that a parsimonious set of predictors—income, perception and report of discrimination, parental socialization, transnational ties, and religious replenishment through high presence of immigrants from Muslim-majority countries in the neighborhood—accounted for a large portion of the observed religiosity differential between natives and second-generation Muslims in France. What do these findings suggest for assimilation theory, and what do they contribute to immigration research in general?

Interpreting these substantive results requires historicizing the Muslim presence in France and in Europe in general. Today’s Muslim minorities are yesterday’s guest workers and their children. Those workers came to Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s in search of better salaries in the postwar economic boom, without intending, or being provided with institutional pathways, to stay permanently (Laurence 2012). The 1973 oil crisis resulted in an economic recession and rising unemployment, leading Western European governments to freeze all guest worker programs. Workers who were already in Europe wanted to preserve their professional future and thus started to bring their family members while hoping that guest worker programs would resume (Moch 2003, pp. 187–88). In the late 1970s, the French government encouraged return migration by offering cash incentives—the “million Stoléru,” equivalent to around €1,500—and discouraged new migration by increasing penalties on undocumented migrants. Those policy initiatives were largely unsuccessful, however, and by 1981 around 1.5 million migrants from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey were present in France.

The unanticipated shock at the origin of the sudden halt of worker programs—the 1973 oil crisis—and the following ambiguities regarding the future and status of ex-guest workers and their families produced a specific mode of entry of migrants from Muslim societies in France, one that was not fully voluntary like earlier migration waves from nearby European countries (Moch 2003). Guest workers and their families who, by and large, did not plan on permanently migrating found themselves as involuntary minorities in a culturally threatening context (i.e., one characterized by secularism and Catholicism). They thus had an incentive to maintain and

transmit their religion to their children as well as links to the country of origin. Meanwhile, their unexpected presence generated widespread cultural anxiety once the economic boom came to a halt in the mid-1970s. The politicization of immigration and immigrant integration then rose in the 1980s, as it became clear that those guest workers were in fact becoming permanent minorities (Castles 1986; Noiriel 1996; Moch 2003; Laurence 2012). Controversies regarding the accommodation of Muslim practices and religiosity emerged a decade later, such as the first “veil affair” in 1989.

In light of such a quasi-accidental mode of entry into French society, we can think of a high religiosity differential among Muslim immigrants and their children in France as resulting from a negative cultural equilibrium. Immigrants from Muslim countries imported high religiosity levels that they successfully transmitted to their children, while maintaining ties with the country of origin and its religious culture. Additionally, guest worker families and their children were typically of modest social origins—experiencing poverty and segregation in immigrant-heavy neighborhoods around major urban centers (Castles 1986, p. 764; Lévy-Vroélant 2006)—both of which may have further encouraged high religiosity across generations. In the French cultural context (Bowen 2007), this has made Muslim families suspicious and liable to stigma and discrimination—thus reinforcing initial cultural differences through reactive religiosity in a circular motion.

This narrative is consistent with recent experimental work on the “negative discriminatory equilibrium” affecting Muslims in France (Adida et al. 2016). Using experimental methods, Adida, Laitin, and Valfort show that there exists a specific type of discrimination against Muslims in France, above and beyond race, and that this discrimination feeds off native perceptions of Muslims’ religious and gender norms (chap. 6). Muslim individuals perceive and react to this discrimination by maintaining a high attachment to their culture of origin and a low level of identification with France. Together, these findings describe the religiosity differential between second-generation Muslims and French natives as an exogenous import from Muslim-majority countries transmitted by parents and social ties, on the one hand, and a reaction to social disadvantage, segregation, and discrimination that is endogenous to the context of reception, on the other hand. In part, these results relate to Wimmer and Soehl’s (2014) description of a “blocked acculturation” among the second generation experiencing social closure and inequality in European countries of destination and maintaining the cultural values of their parents as a result.

The religiosity differential between Muslims and natives is an important social fact, and it helps make sense of many scholarly and political discussions singling out Muslim minorities in Europe. For instance, Muslim demands for accommodation of religious dietary needs in public schools (Bergeaud-Blackler 2014), low rates of religious mixed marriages (Carol

2016), and notoriously conservative attitudes among Muslim communities regarding gender equality and homosexuality (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Soehl 2017*a*) can all be partly explained by Muslims' high levels of religiosity compared to natives. In turn, such tensions directly relate to the repackaging of populist right-wing political platforms around "civilizationism" and the protection of a purported Western European liberal culture against Islam (Brubaker 2017). While these platforms arise as a response to the perceived lack of integration of Muslim populations, it is somewhat ironic that a large portion of the religiosity differential among second-generation Muslims is associated with the experience of inequality and discrimination in the context of reception, since civilizationist platforms would likely worsen these dynamics and thus maintain cultural difference if translated into policy. It is up to further research—including research on the emerging third generation—to investigate how these dynamics of importation, reproduction, and reaction to perceived cultural difference causally relate to one another and result in polarization or assimilation in the long run.

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This article has quantitatively described a phenomenon of delayed religious assimilation across generations of Muslims in France. Using the ISCA, a new empirical strategy for the study of cultural difference between heterogeneous social groups relying on fuzzy clustering and Monte Carlo simulation, I find that second-generation Muslims are more religious than socially comparable natives in terms of subjective religiosity and propensity to follow religiously imposed dietary constraints but not in terms of religious attendance or the propensity to wear religious signs. I also document an even higher level of cultural difference from socially proximate natives among two subgroups within the Muslim population, namely, those who experience a high degree of social disadvantage and those who are members of the urban middle class. Statistical modeling within clusters shows that income, the perception and self-report of discrimination, parental religious socialization, transnational ties, and living in neighborhoods with a high presence of North and sub-Saharan African migrants are associated with higher religiosity, albeit with a differential effect across Muslim subgroups. In particular, decomposition via predicted values shows that a large portion of the observed differential among the second generation is associated with patterns of inequality and social closure that are endogenous to the French context of reception.

In closing, a few remarks about the limitations and potential prospects opened by this study are in order. Despite its large sample and unusually high number of covariates, the study remains strictly descriptive and based on cross-sectional data. This undoubtedly constitutes a strong limitation, as

assimilation is an inherently dynamic and temporal process. Many mechanisms hypothesized to be at work here, such as reactive religiosity, religious replenishment, and transnational ties, are hard to measure without confounders in observational data. It is possible that some of the relationships I document are in part confounded with self-selection and reverse causality, so that more religious Muslims maintain more transnational ties and are more prone to live in ethnically and religiously segregated neighborhoods, for instance. These limitations notwithstanding, the holistic approach I took to studying the religiosity differential brought several separate strands of the existing literature into one coherent analytical framework, and the empirical links I established between cultural difference and patterns of cultural transmission, inequality, and closure are substantively important in spite of remaining ambiguities on causality. It is up to future work to document and describe these relationships with methods better suited for causal inference. Experimental and longitudinal data are needed to further study the processes at work among Muslims in France (see Adida et al. [2016] for a recent experimental example on discrimination).

Finally, let us restate an important point: heterogeneity matters in the empirical reality of social categories. Scholars of migration and intergroup relations can and should be wary of taking evident social categories of the migration process, such as immigrants or Muslims, as natural categories of analysis. The “Muslim” label covers a diverse reality made up of distinct pathways of religious assimilation. This study’s empirical approach consisting in decomposing nominal Muslims and natives into empirical subgroups, as well as the documenting of heterogeneous statistical effects among them, suggests that a data-driven deconstruction of bounded groups to avoid their reification is not a fashionable intellectual posture but an analytical desideratum.

APPENDIX A

Background on the Muslim Presence in Western Europe

Contemporary Muslim immigration dates back to the migration flows of foreign male workers brought in to help rebuild Europe after World War II. Stimulated by the Marshall Plan, European economies were in full swing during the 1950s and 1960s and relied on bilateral treaties to temporarily import the much needed extra manpower from countries with which they had close ties inherited from colonialism or historical alliances. Britain thus relied on Pakistani and Indian workers, Germany on Turkish ones, and France on Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian ones. Those male workers sought employment abroad because the better pay allowed them to send remittances to their home country; in turn, national governments were happy not to worry about their integration since it was a straightforward guest

worker arrangement in which workers would voluntarily return to their home countries (Laurence 2012). Workers rotated freely between countries, and their presence or culture did not generate widespread hostility in Europe at the time. It was in fact quite the opposite: upwardly mobile European workers happily gave away their manufacturing and construction jobs as they entered the middle class en masse (Noiriel 1996; Laurence 2012).

This political and social arrangement came to a brutal halt in 1974 when Western economies fell into recession as a result of the first oil shock. Unemployment sharply rose, and European governments stopped all flows of foreign workers. Those who were in Europe at the time stayed, and migration flows virtually changed overnight, from male workers to the family members those workers had left behind. The Muslim presence in Western Europe has since then been deeply contentious and coincided with the rise of identity, immigration, and immigrant integration as objects of political debate (Noiriel 1996). In Germany, these tensions took the form of important debates on the reform of nationality law and the public funding of Islamic religious institutions (Joppke and Torpey 2013), while debates revolved around multiculturalism in Great Britain and the Netherlands. In France, policy and scholarly debates revolved around the integration of Muslim practices and claims in the existing church-state institutional framework of *laïcité* (secularism), promoting a strict relegation of religion to the private sphere (Bowen 2007). Several “veil affairs” and requests for dietary accommodation in public schools have, in particular, generated much controversy.

Muslims are now the largest and fastest growing religious minority in Europe, making up 3.5% of the national population on average in Western European countries (Laurence 2012; Pew Research Center 2015). Muslims in France, however, represent 7%–8% of the national population, accounting for around 4.5 million people forming the largest Muslim minority relative to the national population in Europe (Pew Research Center 2015).

APPENDIX B

Cluster Validation Measures to Determine the Best Number of Clusters in the Sample of French Natives




FIG. B1.—Cluster validation measures across number of clusters for French native sample

This study uses certain validation measures to help choose the number of clusters used to break down the native French reference sample in several reference categories. The Xie-Beni index should be minimized. The fuzzy silhouette index should be maximized. The modified partition coefficient

index should be maximized. The partition coefficient index should be maximized. Partition entropy should be minimized. The silhouette index should be maximized.

All results were computed with the *fclust* package (Giordani, Ferraro, and Serafini 2019; see for more details on each measure) in R. The results indicate that three-, four-, and five-cluster solutions are best. The reasoning is that a four-cluster solution yields the best compromise between producing well-defined clusters, preserving within-group sample size for later analyses, and parsimony. Additionally, and importantly, I used the human perception criterion (Grimmer and King 2010) to determine whether the proposed solutions formed meaningful (i.e., interpretable) clusters in which the four- and five-cluster solutions emerged as forming the most easily recognizable subgroups.

APPENDIX C

Assignment Uncertainty across Iterations in Step 2




FIG. C1.—Assignment overlap among French native respondents in two randomly chosen iterations (ISCA step 2)

A majority of individuals receive the same assignments, but there exists significant variation between the two random draws from \mathbf{p} . Nevertheless, our iterative procedure and averaging across iterations is justified by the significant variation that exists across iterations. This variation, in turn, is due to some observations having more balanced membership scores in \mathbf{p} . In spite of this uncertainty, however, the low Monte Carlo errors in table 2 suggest that while individual observations' assignment may vary significantly across iterations, each iteration is composed of relatively similar subgroups. A sufficiently high number of d iterations produces overall balancing and well-differentiated subgroups.

APPENDIX D

Supplementary Analyses

TABLE D1
PERCENTAGE DECOMPOSITION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HIGH AND LOW PROFILES
FOR FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION MUSLIMS

	SUBJECTIVE RELIGIOSITY	FOLLOWING DIETARY CONSTRAINTS
	High-Low Δ	High-Low Δ
C1, working class:		
Material insecurity	4.09	7.58
Discrimination	7.33	13.38
Parental socialization	56.56	30.23
Transnational ties	25.85	38.75
Replenishment	6.17	10.16
C2, peripheral petite bourgeoisie:		
Material insecurity	6.78	9.88
Discrimination	8.49	10.56
Parental socialization	47.74	32.15
Transnational ties	23.70	29.02
Replenishment	13.29	18.39
C3, urban middle class+:		
Material insecurity	7.66	11.63
Discrimination	7.93	12.12
Parental socialization	54.86	37.70
Transnational ties	19.02	24.18
Replenishment	10.53	14.37
C4, socially dependent:		
Material insecurity	10.64	8.12
Discrimination	14.59	17.42
Parental socialization	52.19	33.21
Transnational ties	18.33	24.72
Replenishment	4.24	16.53

NOTE.—Percentage decomposition of the difference between high and low profiles for predicted religiosity values, by dimension of religiosity and clusters for Muslim respondents (first and second generation). Percentages do not add up to 100 because of rounding.

TABLE D2
EMPIRICAL MEAN VALUES FOR VARIABLES OF INTEREST IN THE ANALYTICAL SAMPLE

Cluster Assignment	Working Class	Peripheral Petite Bourgeoisie	Urban Middle Class+	Socially Dependent
Subjective religiosity (0–2)86	.69	.69	.84
Following dietary constraints (0–2)63	.43	.44	.75
Proportion Catholic immigrants24	.28	.22	.16
Proportion Muslim immigrants35	.23	.27	.45
Proportion natives19	.24	.24	.17
Proportion living in 100,000+ city71	.31	.75	.72
Proportion working a job79	.83	.83	.39
Proportion female39	.48	.40	.65
Age (18–60)	42.20	41.75	34.72	31.50
Proportion with high school degree or more22	.27	.78	.28
Household income in thousands of euros (0–120)	14.42	20.39	23.42	12.89
Proportion reporting subjective hardship29	.17	.12	.31
Proportion perceiving high level of discrimination51	.51	.57	.53
Proportion reporting discrimination within last five years11	.09	.13	.17
Proportion reporting high importance of religion in parental education32	.24	.23	.30
Proportion reporting transnational ties54	.46	.47	.53
Proportion living in top decile for percentage of North African immigrants27	.17	.19	.31
Proportion living in top decile for percentage of sub-Saharan African immigrants21	.11	.20	.22
Count	5,052.04	3,469.22	4,872.34	4,904.40

NOTE.—Average, unweighted values by cluster for variables of interest in the final analytical sample used for all models presented (ISCA step 3). The results are averages for cluster means obtained from $d = 500$ iterations of stochastic assignment based on the \mathbf{p} vector of membership probabilities (ISCA step 2). Most cross-cluster differences are statistically significant, and hence empirical standard deviations are not reported. Counts are not round values because of averaging the number of respondents in each cluster across iterations.




FIG. D1.—Coefficients for regression models of subjective religiosity, by subgroups as well as one pooled model, among first-, second-generation, and native respondents. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo standard errors. The model also includes interaction effects for immigrants identifying as Protestant, Christian, and nonreligious (not shown). All models include controls for gender, age, squared age, and education (not shown).




FIG. D2.—Coefficients for regression models of following religiously imposed dietary constraints, by subgroups as well as one pooled model, among first-, second-generation, and native respondents. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo standard errors. The model also includes interaction effects for immigrants identifying as Protestant, Christian, and nonreligious (not shown). All models include controls for gender, age, squared age, and education (not shown).

Predicting subjective religiosity: importance of religion in respondent's life (0-2 scale) no religious sign :




FIG. D3.—Coefficients for regression models of subjective religiosity, by subgroups as well as one pooled model, restricted to respondents who never wear a religious sign among second-generation and native respondents. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo standard errors. The model also includes interaction effects for immigrants identifying as Protestant, Christian, and nonreligious (not shown). All models include controls for gender, age, squared age, and education (not shown).




FIG. D4.—Coefficients for regression models of following religiously imposed dietary constraints, by subgroups as well as one pooled model, restricted to respondents who never wear a religious sign among second-generation and native respondents. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals based on Monte Carlo standard errors. The model also includes interaction effects for immigrants identifying as Protestant, Christian, and nonreligious (not shown). All models include controls for gender, age, squared age, and education (not shown).

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